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THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE
MODERN INSTITUTIONAL STATE
Governor Brendan T. Byrne*
Almost a quarter of a century ago I entered public life in my
native state of New Jersey as an executive assistant to Governor Robert
B. Meyner. At that time, the budget for the State of New Jersey was
$242 million. We appropriated $72 million as our contribution to
education and $60 million for our support of the then combined
Department of Institutions and Agencies which included traditional
penal systems, hospitals, and homes for the mentally and physically
disabled. We provided practically no medical care for the needy or
elderly.
Since that time there has been a dramatic growth in institutional
commitments of government to society. Our current state budget is
nearly $5 billion; almost $2 billion is allocated for education, and
nearly $1 billion for human services. We support a system of mass
transit with appropriations of several hundred million dollars.
Equally dramatic are the changes in other forms of delivery of
services to citizens. I campaigned for, and was able to have enacted
into law, a substantially revised statutory system affecting landlordtenant rights. Similarly, I have been an active supporter of protection
of consumers' rights through administrative action by the Division of
Consumer Affairs in the Attorney General's Office. Moreover, I lobbied strongly for the creation of a Department of the Public Advocate
designed to provide a voice for those New Jersey citizens unable to
speak for themselves.
Throughout these years of structural change, I have had a unique
opportunity to observe the unfolding issues from a variety of levels:
first, as an Executive Assistant to the Governor; then, as a Chief
Prosecutor for one of the state's most populous counties, Essex; next,
in the position of a member of the Board of Public Utilities Commissioners, as a member of a Governor's Cabinet; and, finally, before
seeking the office of Governor, as an Assignment Judge in the Superior
Court of New Jersey. From this perspective I would like to share my
reflections as to why courts exist and what roles they can perform
better than the other developing branches of government.
*A.B., Princeton University, 1949: LL.B., Harvard University, 1951.
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We must first ask ourselves if we really heed courts and if they in
fact perform functions which cannot be done by the executive or the
legislature. To understand this we must understand our own history.
Based on our political experience before the War of Independence and
as colonists governed under written charters proceeding from the
English Sovereign, the terms and limitations of these charters were
subject to forfeiture, review, and final appeal to a Privy Council. This
restraint on the exercise of power was considered normal, and it was a
usual procedure when our colonial courts enforced these chartered
rights.
The revolution cut the cord that tied us to Great Britain and the
foreign sovereign by designating a new ruler-the people. Under
almost every state constitution and under the federal Constitution this
power of the people was reposed in three branches of government,
executive, legislative and judicial.
Historically, resolution of disputes had been a function of the
executive in royal governments and English courts began as an extension of the executive delegation of royal power to the King's agents. It
was only relatively late in the process that judges claimed to have
independence from the King to interpret the law.
We also know that legislatures can resolve disputes among parties. The British Parliament passed many bills deciding for one private
interest over another. Congress and state legislatures still pass "special" bills which may affect a single individual or dispute. In sum, the
need to resolve disputes, in itself, did not mean that a separate independent judicial system was required. In the modern institutional
state, many disputes are solved on an executive or administrative level
through consumer representatives, or through efforts of public advocates to obtain uniform lease-hold relations.
I submit, however, that although the judiciary is not in a strict
sense essential to society, it has evolved to its present state perhaps
because it is perceived as resolving disputes better than the other
branches of government. If we ask ourselves whether we prefer to
have personal disputes resolved by the executive, legislative or judicial
branch, I believe the consensus of the public will answer that a
judicial resolution of disputes is preferable.
Why is this so? I believe it is because of the credibility of the
judiciary in the eyes of the general public. Of the three branches of
government, the judiciary is the only one which claims to make its
decisions based on permanent objective standards divorced from democratic or majoritarian political processes. Opinions of courts are, at
least in theory, based upon an objective analysis of the facts of each
case, compared with existing law or constitutional mandates and
expressed in a logical and well-reasoned statement supporting the
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judgment. The strength of the judiciary has been its ability to base
decisions on this mystical combination of objectivity and permanence.
While finding the law is no simple task, there remains this public
acceptance that judges interpret a higher law which is fixed and
certain and fair.
Some examples of history demonstrate the difficulty, however, of
applying these principles of objectivity and permanency to interpret
changing economic and social circumstances. National experience,
even within the last half century, has demonstrated the unpredictability of labeling individual judges as strict constructionists, conservatives, judicial activists or liberals.
This confusion of labels was never more obvious than in 1936. A
Supreme Court, which we now consider to have been a conservative
guardian of the status quo in American society, was comprised of
judicial activists who expanded the protection of liberty under the
fourteenth amendment. The dissenters in Morehead v. New York ex
rel. Tipaldot assailed this expansion of liberty as a deification of the
private wage bargain because it invalidated state minimum wage
laws as depriving employer and employee of what the court called the
"equal right to obtain from each other the best terms they can by
private bargaining." 2 Such a decision is inconceivable to us now. It is
ironic to speak of freedom of contract for those who, because of
economic necessities, give services for less than needed to keep their
bodies together. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone suggested the basis for
such a decision when he said:
[I]t is difficult to imagine any grounds, other than our own personal economic predilections, for saying that the contract of employment is any the less an appropriate subject of legislation than
are scores of others, in dealing with which this Court has held that
3
legislatures may curtail individual freedom in the public interest.
Out of this constitutional crisis of the New Deal developed a plea
for judicial self-restraint. The Supreme Court had invalidated laws
dealing with the exploitation of women in industry, the regulation of
wages in the coal industry, and the regulation of wages for children.
The result was to play into the hands of radical change, and, into this
breach Franklin D. Roosevelt stepped with his famous courtpacking
scheme:
[He] had begun to suspect that a majority of the Justices would
continue to treat the Constitution as a device for preventing action

2
3

298 U.S. 587, 627-31 (1936) (Hughes, C.J., Brandeis, Cardozo & Stone, JJ.,dissenting).
Id. at 610.
Id. at 633 (Stone, J.,dissenting).
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rather than as an instrument of progress .... [so he boldly declared] that 'the number of Justices should be increased at once so
as to give a favorable majority.' Prospects for obtaining a favorable
majority through the normal process of retirement were slim, despite the fact that several members of the bench were well [into
pretheir seventies and eighties] . . . .Nevertheless, the President
4
ferred to delay action until 'forced' by public opinion.
One commentator of the time observed " '[i]t is better strategy, politically, to let a universal popular exasperation set the forces of reform in
motion.'
The rest is known. Despite popular outcry, despite almost universal dissatisfaction with the decisions of the Court, an attempt by an
executive to attack the institution itself resulted in one of the greatest
closing of ranks in recent political history. Through the years and
despite increasing evidence that judicial interpretation, not fundamental law, regulated the power to govern, the American people had
come to regard the court as a symbol of their freedom and as an
impregnable bar against any risk of dictatorship and personal government. Every segment of society soon joined in the struggle to preserve
the institution. History does not reveal how this issue would have been
resolved if Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts had not, in the
next term, found their way to sanction collective bargaining provisions of the Railway Labor Act and, in a most sweeping decision, to
uphold the Wagner Labor Relations Act. The New Deal's judicial
field day wound up with opinions upholding Social Security taxes and
the Old Age Pension system and establishing the fundamental constitutional support for the social changes of the New Deal.
What are the lessons of this experience? Judicial activism could
be applied in defense of conservative economic policies, but the institution of the judiciary, despite its weaknesses, had the confidence of
the American people.
This problem of judicial choice is compounded by a system which
allows me, or a succeeding Governor, during the term of a justice of
our state supreme court to consider the judicial philosophy of the
individual as well as his predilection for social change. Of course,
there are dangers in judicial policy making, but I believe these dangers are inherent in the system and actually give the system strength.
Surprisingly, little debate or critical analysis was devoted to-the
judiciary in the deliberations of the Framers. "Farrand's records of the
''5

I

A. MASON, HARLAN FIsKE STONE:
IId. at 438 (citation omitted).
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437-38 (1968) (citation omitted).
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Convention contain almost no reference to the separation of powers as
it relate[d] to limits on the judiciary." 6 It is surmised that the national judiciary was created " 'more in deference to the maxim of
separation than in response to clearly formulated ideas.... [I]f there
' 7
was debate in terms of need and utility, it was not reported." '
Ratification debates instead tended to focus on the parameters of
executive and legislative power.
Perhaps a simpler view of the role of the judiciary can be found
in the words of Alexander Hamilton. Suspicious of democratic powers
he said in his 78th Federalist:
It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to
be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature in
order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits
assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the
proper and peculiar province of the-courts. A constitution is in fact,
and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. It
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative
bod..... Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that
the power of the people is superior to both, and that where the will
of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to
that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to
be governed by the latter rather than the former. 8
This is a fundamentally radical thought-that the people are
paramount, and is reflected, oddly enough, in the powerful slogans of
the Sixties, which witnessed revolutionary change in the way courts
went about doing their business. "Power to the people" was a constant
refrain of protesters of that era.
In response to this deep-felt need, there has developed the role of
the judiciary as an instrument of justice designed to restore power to
the people. In so doing, the courts raised a new question with respect
to their role. The question was not so much whether they had exceeded their substantive decision-making power but rather whether
they had exceeded their procedural decision-making power by deciding problems in a different way and in a new and different historical
pattern. Are they deciding questions best decided by other institu-

6 Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinaryin InstitutionalLitigation, 93
HAv. L. REv. 465, 497 n.155 (1980).
IId. at 497 n.155 (quoting J. GOEBAL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATES 206 (1971).
8 THE FEDERALST PAPERS 102 (L. DeKoster ed. 1976) (emphasis added).

OF THE UNITED

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:653

tions? How deeply is the court affecting one element of society when it
decides whether a woman has a right to an abortion at public expense? How deeply felt is the feeling of a legislative body when a court
orders that body to reapportion its members? Has the intervention of
courts into these areas once considered political been helpful? Has the
lack of legislative leadership or legislative consensus on a federal and
state level been partially due to judicial interference in traditional
legislative processes? Would legislative systems indeed work better
without the courts?
I do not suggest that I have the answer to these questions. But
based upon my experience as a chief executive, I do say there is a
proper role for the judiciary in helping to resolve fundamental social
problems when the development of a majoritarian consensus is beyond practical expectation. I leave the specific description of this role
to the scholars of the law who are now beginning to rationalize and
harmonize this extraordinary growth in novel forms of litigation. 9 The
semantics of the modern scholar are foreign to me; he deals with
subjects such as transformations of dispute resolution models, the new
formalism, the dilemmas of instrumentalism, and intransigence and
political power. Suffice it to say that there are two schools of thought.
The first school, as suggested by Professor Fiss, is that what we have
witnessed and what we are still witnessing is a dramatically new form
of justice, "its roots in the Warren Court era and the extraordinary
effort to translate the rule of Brown v. Board of Education into
practice."' 10 To that end, courts were forced to transform radically
the status quo in order to reconstruct social reality. "No one had a
road map at the outset . . . [or] a clear vision of all that would be
involved in trying to eradicate the caste system embedded in a state
bureaucracy."" Professor Fiss' theory is that there are practically no
standards for decision and even those suggested in United States v.
Carolene Products,2 concerning legislative failure and the protection
of a "discrete and insular minority," failed to explain the decisions
which followed. His theory suggests that the role of the judge is, if I
may exaggerate for purposes of illustration, a Don Quixote seeking out
the meaning of constitutional values by working within the constitutional text, history, and social ideals and by searching for what is true,
right, or just. Why must such a knight wait for legislative failure to

See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: "The Forms of justice," 93 HARV
L. REv. 1 (1979). See generally Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 6.
10 Fiss, supra note 9, at 2.
n id. at 3.
12 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See Fiss, supra note 9, at 6.
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find what is true, right, or just? He recognizes, just as we recognized
in the Thirties, that the further one moves from simple application of
law to fact, the easier it is for judges to enact into law their own
preferences in the name of having discovered the true meaning, say,
of equality or liberty.
Other commentators, such as Professors Eisenberg and Yeazell,
are of the opposite school of thought and believe that the new litigation represents an historical continuity and that no one familiar with
the traditions of the common law and its regulation of large complicated corporate businesses or large and complex trusts finds such
action by a court extraordinary. 13 Indeed, the oldest writs, such as
certiorari or mandamus, are the tools of administrative supervision.
These writers suggest, and I tend to agree with them, that what we
are seeing is not a new form of litigation but an old form of litigation
applied to what have heretofore been considered political questions.
Once the Supreme Court had embarked upon administrative supervision to enforce its decrees it was just one final step to determine, in
Baker v. Carr,14 that Tennessee's districting scheme distorted the concept of one man, one vote and established the loss of a constitutional
right of an order higher than the constitutional principle of avoiding
involvement in political issues because of the separation of powers.
My personal experience in such constitutional litigation has led
me to the conclusion that the courts do have a substantive role as an
instrument of justice in determining the institutional arrangements of
power in the modern state. In our own State of New Jersey, Kenneth
Robinson was a young student in a Jersey City grammar school when
persons having an interest in his welfare and in a city budget brought
a suit against Governor William Cahill alleging that, as a result of the
resources of local taxable properties being insufficient to generate
revenues to provide a thorough and efficient education, Kenneth was
denied his constitutional right to such an education as mandated by
the New Jersey Constitution.' 5 Kenneth Robinson convinced the Supreme Court of New Jersey that he indeed had a right to this constitutional value and that the existing institutional forms of government
did not afford him the vindication of that right. What was needed
See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 6, at 488-94.
369 U.S. 186 (1962). See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 6, at 501.
" 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (Robinson I), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976, afJ'd on rehearing,
jurisdictionretained, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973) (Robinson II), order entered, 67 N.J. 35,
335 A.2d 6 (Robinson III), order entered, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193, republished, 69 N.J. 133,
351 A.2d 713 (1975) (Robinson IV), order vacated, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976) (Robinson
V), injunction issued, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (Robinson VI), injunction dissolved, 70 N.J.
464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976) (Robinson VII).
"
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then was a remedy. The first remedy adopted by the court was an
adjudication, in the traditional mold, of the invalidity of the taxing
system and the institutional system of free public education with a
direction that the legislature should correct this constitutional infirmity. The legislature did not act and the court's next step was to
reallocate State education funds if the legislature continued to be
passive. The New Jersey legislature responded to this under my leadership by passing the Public School Education Act of 1975,16 the
purpose of which was to guarantee the delivery of that thorough and
efficient system of education by providing a minimum state level of
funding to local school districts to equalize property values on a per
pupil basis statewide. The failure in the law was that the legislature
failed to provide the funds to implement the legislation. Again, the
case returned to the New Jersey supreme court 7 and this time I took
the most unusual step of appearing pro se before the court and arguing that now a suitable remedy would be to determine that since the
system of public education was not functioning in accordance with
the constitutional mandate, it should cease to operate and, in essence,
the court should direct that the schools of New Jersey be closed. This
was done and, following a bruising legislative struggle, there was
enacted into law a new form of statewide taxation in the form of an
income levy dedicated to property tax relief and the support of education for the State of New Jersey. Some have questioned the power of
the courts to entertain and indeed to enforce in such institutional
litigation remedies which result in the expenditures of public funds. It
takes little observation to realize that when courts decide that welfare
dispensers must give recipients a hearing before ending their benefits,
additional funds have to be expended for these purposes. When indigent criminal defendants have a right to counsel, prosecuting agencies
will have to spend more money. When courts order desegregation
plans to be put into effect or a reallocation of pupils, funds, or
teachers, public funds will be spent. Some may shudder to believe that
a court could impose a tax or indeed order that a Governor's taxing
proposal become law. Over a period of years I have given much
thought to what other remedies would have worked-a contempt
citation against the legislature, judicial redistribution of state funds
and so forth. I have reflected upon the unique circumstances which
placed upon the bench at the time of the Robinson decision a Chief
Justice who had also been the Chief Executive of New Jersey, Richard
16 1975 N.J. LAWS, ch. 212, N.J. STAT. Ann. §§ 18A:7A-1 to 33 (West Cum. Supp. 19801981).
17 Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976).
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J. Hughes. It is suggested that the weakness in institutional litigation
by the courts is the unwillingness of courts to extend their power
beyond areas where they believe they can gain public support and
institutional acceptance. One can never be certain whether our New
Jersey supreme court would have confronted the legislature without
the support of the executive branch.
I do not believe that our supreme court was straining to find a
legal basis for a policy decision. Rather, I think the court was an
instrument of justice in vindicating individual rights of litigants. Its
role in that institutional litigation was gradual and it sought a remedy
to suit the peculiar circumstances. Its historic conclusion is well
founded in the Constitution and Hamilton's original thought that
each of the departments of government was an agency of the people
whose role was to give meaning and vitality to that Constitution. I
realize that judges are not in control of the cases before them, that
they do not have the full breadth of perspective that the legislator
walking the streets has or the executive, but conversely, they are
compelled to speak back, they are compelled to respond to the case
before them and in the last analysis they are compelled to determine
the rights of the parties before them. Long ago, James Bradley Thayer
said that the judiciary should, in dealing with the acts of their coordinates, refrain from intervening wherever it is possible to do so, but he
concluded by saying:
On the other hand, by adhering rigidly to its own duty, the court
will help, as nothing else can, to fix the spot where responsibility
lies, and to bring down on that precise locality the thunderbolt of
popular condemnation ....
For that course-the true course of
judicial duty always-will powerfully help to bring the people and
their representatives to a sense of their own responsibility.' 8
Through my experience and in my judgment, by bringing to the
people and their representatives in New Jersey's constitutional crisis
the sharp delineation of the spot where responsibility lay for the
vindication of individual rights, our judicial system helped to bring to
our elected representatives a sense of their own duty. I am concerned
that in this era of diminishing resources that a court should decide the
priorities for use of those resources. As this process goes on, others will
articulate in a more detailed way those standards which shall be
applied in this unfolding system of law as an instrument of justice. I
18 J. THAYRm, JOHN MARSHALL 103-10 (1901). See J. THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 41 n.2 (1908).
See generally J. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw,
7 HAav. L. REv. 129 (1893).
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believe the principles of the litigation I saw work in New Jersey will
be applicable in other jurisdictions. The powerlessness of the minority
group to alter the vindication of its rights through the political processes, the inability of traditional majoritarian political structures to
reach a consensus on vindicating those rights and, finally, a lack of a
comprehensive legislative response to that need justified institutional
litigation helping to bring about structural reform in government. In
so doing, the best traditions of the law and constitutional government
were maintained.

